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We construct a simple model of the determinants of administrative
managerial effort and apply it explain the doubling of the cost of
administering primary care in England in real terms between 1989/90 and
1994/5 following the introduction of the internal market. We find that the
main cost driver was the number of GPs, that there are economies of scale
but not economies of scope in administration, and that fundholding appeared
to increase administrative costs. Most the increase in administrative cost over
the period could not be explained by the change in the cost drivers or
fundholding, suggesting that the recent abolition of fundholding may do little
to reduce primary care administrative costs.
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1. Introduction
This paper estimates a cost function for primary care administration using a panel of data for
Family Health Service Authorities (FHSAs) in England.  It makes a number of methodological
and substantive contributions.
First, we set out a simple model of the determinants of administrative costs.  We use the model
to examine the implications of endogenous managerial effort for what is meant by inefficiency
and for the estimation of the cost function.  The econometric approach to the estimation of the
cost administrative cost function which we use has been advocated in previous discussions of
the measurement of efficiency (Schmidt and Sicklets, 1984).  Our modelling approach is
therefore of wider interest for the estimation of efficiency in health care.  In particular it
complements the debate in the Symposium on Frontier Estimation in the  Journal of Health
Economics
1 which focused on alternative methods for estimating efficiency, rather than on the
welfare implications of the estimates.
Second, we examine how far the doubling of administrative expenditure between 1989/90 and
1994/5 is due to shifts in the cost function and changes in administrative tasks.  Our analysis is
relevant to the debate about the effect of the introduction of the internal market in the British
National Health Services (NHS) and the changes to the contract between the NHS and the
general practitioners who act as gatekeepers to the system.  One of the justifications for the
current sweeping changes in the organisation of the NHS is that the introduction of the internal
market and the changes to the general practitioners contract from 1989/90 onward led,
amongst other things, to an increase in administration costs (Department of Health, 1997).  By
estimating an administrative cost function for primary care services we provide some evidence
of the possible effect of the internal market, in particular of the spread of fundholding
practices, on administrative costs in primary care.
Third, the cost function enables us to examine the extent of economies of scale and scope in
primary care administration.  The recent reorganisation of the NHS has led to a devolution of
some administrative responsibilities for primary care from health  authorities to more numerous
                                                
1 See the papers in the  Journal of Health Economics, 13(3), 1994, pages 255-346.3
lower level units (Primary Care Groups).  It also expected that the reforms will lead health
authorities to merge (Department of Health, 1997).
Fourth, the estimated cost function is relevant for the current policy focus on explicit
measurement of performance and initiatives to reduce administrative cost (Department of
Health, 1997; NHS Executive, 1998).  We use the estimated cost function to examine
differences in administrative expenditure across health authorities and the  potential gains
achievable if such differences can be attributed to differences in efficiency.
Section 2 presents a simple model of the determinants of administrative costs and discusses
whether differences in costs imply differences in efficiency.  Section 3 gives the institutional
background and outlines the data.  Section 4 describes the regression model and estimation
methods.  Section 5 presents and discusses the results.  Section 6 concludes.
2. Modelling inefficiency
In this section we set out a simple model of the determinants of administrative costs.  We
suppose that endogenous managerial effort affects administrative cost so that what is usually
measured as exogenous inefficiency is in fact endogenous.  This has implications both for the
welfare interpretation of the empirical results and for the estimation of the administrative cost
function.  Our approach is similar to Gaynor and Pauly (1990) in that we allow for endogenous
effort but do so in a rather different institutional setting with different property rights.
2.1 Managerial effort and administrative costs
The manager in the primary health care authority controls a vector of administrative inputs
L1,…,Ln (clerks, office space, computers, etc.) with parametric input prices  w1,.., wn.  The
manager receives a salary  w0.  Defining  L = ( L1,…,Ln) total administrative expenditure is  w0 +
wL.  The authority’s main task is administering payments to primary care practitioners and
service providers (GPs, dentists, opticians, pharmacies).  (We give a fuller account of the role
of the health authority in section 4).4
There is an administrative technology defined by
2
g a q L x (,, ;)‡ 0 ga > 0 ,gq < 0 ,gL < 0 ,gx < 0 , (1)
where  a is the effort of the manager,  q is a vector of endogenous variables which can be
influenced by health authority managers, and  x is a vector of exogenous variables.
To fix ideas we think of  q as measuring some aspects of the quality of care provided in the
authority, for example the proportion of women aged 25-64 who receive a cervical smear.
Managers can increase this proportion by providing information and advice to general
practitioners.  Increases in the proportion can trigger additional payments to GPs and hence
additional processing by the FSHA, so that an increase in  q may be costly.
The components of  x include the primary care workers (GPs, dentists, opticians, etc.) in the
authority: the more such workers the greater the administrative services required in connection
with payments, budget setting and monitoring.   x also includes population characteristics (such
as morbidity) and characteristics of the authority, such as its area and transport facilities.  We
assume for the purposes of this section that the primary care work force to be serviced by the
authority is exogenous.
3  We test for the endogeneity of the quality and primary care worker
variables in section 5.
Suppose that the managerial utility function is 
4
m m a r x w b q x wL a w = = - - + (,;, ) (;) b b b b 0 1 2
2
3 0 (2)
where  bi  > 0,  i =0,...,3.  Managers prefer higher salaries and dislike effort.  In equation (2),
b( q;x) is the net social benefit from the health care provided with given numbers of primary
care staff supplying primary care services of quality  q to a given population.  Note that  b is net
of the costs of GPs, other primary care staff, pharmaceuticals prescribed etc.  Managers are
concerned both about the health of the population and the costs of providing primary care.
This may be because of altruism or because they care about the judgement of their professional
                                                
2  gq, gL, gx are (vectors of) partial derivatives with respect to the components of  q,L,y. We define the
components of  x so that increases in  x tighten the technology constraint.
3 The remuneration of primary care staff was nationally negotiated.
4 Many of our points would be valid with a more general function but this simple form enables sharper
conclusions to be drawn.5
expertise which is based on the performance of their authority and its administrative
expenditure.
If we define  a as effective effort, the parameter  b2 can capture the tastes and the productivity
of the manager.  For example, suppose that managers care about the number of hours they
work and that  h hours input by a manager of calibre  j yields effective effort  a =  hj.  Then
b'2h
2 is the cost of  h hours and  b2a
2
  = ( b'2/j
2) a
2 is the cost of effective effort where  b2 reflects
both the manager's preferences  and his productivity.
We examine the decisions by the manager in three stages.
5  At stage 1, for given  a,q,x, and  w,
the manager’s chooses  L subject to the technological constraint  g( a,q,L;x)  ‡ 0.  Even if
managerial salary  w0 is an increasing function of administrative expenditure we assume that the
manager’s preference parameters and the relationship between salary and administrative
expenditures are such that, for given  a,q,x, and  w, managerial utility is a monotonically
decreasing function of administrative expenditure.
6  Hence the manager’s decision is equivalent
to choosing  L to minimise the cost of the non-managerial inputs.  The preference parameters  b
have no effect on the stage 1 decision since they merely scale the input prices.  The optimal
input vector  L( a,q;x,w) gives the administrative cost function conditional on effort:
L C C C C C w x q a C w x q a wL w C w a x q a = < > > < = + =   , 0   , 0   , 0   , 0        ), , ; , ( ) , ; , ( 0 (3)
The manager’s stage 2 decision is to choose managerial effort, for given  q, to maximise
m b q x C a q x w a w = - - + + b b b b b 0 1 2
2
3 1 0 (;) (,;, ) ( ) (4)
The first order condition is
b b 1 2 2 0 C a q x w a a(,;, )- = (5)
yielding the optimal effort decision  a a q x w
o o = (;, , ) b  and the administrative cost function
                                                
5 We assume that  b is concave in  q and that the feasible set defined by the administrative production technology
g( .)   is convex so that the optimisation problems at each stage are well behaved and first order conditions
identify unique global solutions.
6 The effect on managerial utility of an increase in non-managerial administrative expenditure is  - b1 +
b3w0'( wL) so that provided that  w0'( wL) is sufficiently small, utility declines with expenditure.6
C C a q x w q x w C q x w
o o o = = ( (;, , ), ;, ) (;, , ) b b (6)
The comparative static properties are straightforward.   Effort is increasing in b1 and
decreasing in b2.  Increases in quality q and the exogenous variables x increase effort if and
only if they increase the productivity of effort ( Caq  < 0,  Cax  < 0).
Unsurprisingly, managers supply more effort, at a given  q, if they place greater weight on the
administration cost relative to their effort cost.  More productive managers, who therefore
have smaller marginal costs of effective effort, also supply a greater amount of effective effort,
though they may put in fewer nominal hours.  Although increases in  q or  x increase
administration costs, their effect on effort depends on whether they increase the cost by
reducing the effects of additional effort.  Alternatively, since  Caq = Cqa, Cax = Cxa  effort
increases with these variables if it reduces their marginal cost.
7
The stage three decision is to choose quality, taking account of its effect on the net benefits  b
and on administrative costs  C
o.  The first order condition is, remembering that  a
o is chosen
optimally,





o - - + = - = ( ) (,) ( ,;, ) (7)
The optimal  q q x w
oo oo = (, , ) b  and  a a q x w a x w
oo o oo oo = = ( ;, , ) (, , ) b b  give the observed
level of administrative costs in the authority
C C a x w q x w x w C x w
oo oo oo oo = = ( (, , ), (, , ), , ) (, , ) b b b (8)
Using the first order conditions (7) and (5) we see that  quality is increasing in b0 but that the
effects of the other preference parameters depend on  Caq because they will also induce changes
in effort, and therefore in the marginal cost of quality.  Thus










1 1 = - - (9)










1 2 = - (10)7
Since  a
o
b1 0 > and   a
o
b2 0 < we see that  if additional effort reduces the marginal cost of quality
then quality decreases with b2 but may increase or fall with b1.  Increases in the effort
parameter  b2 reduce effort and this increases the marginal cost of quality, thereby reducing its
optimal level.  However, although increases in the value of cost reductions  b1 increase effort
and reduce the marginal cost of quality, this effect is counteracted by the fact that increases in
quality are costly and a greater weight is attached to such increases.
2.2 Policy implications
In section 5 we estimate an administrative cost function from data on administrative
expenditure and its determinants.  If their preference parameters differ, managers will supply
different amounts of effort, conditional on the other determinants of administrative
expenditure.  Those with lower effort levels will have higher administrative costs.  What is the
policy significance of such cost differences?  Suppose that the welfare function is
S b q x wL a = - - g g g 0 1 2
2 (;) (11)
Welfare is identical to the manager’s objective function except for the possibly different
weights on the net benefits, the costs of the non-managerial administrative inputs and the
manager’s effort costs.  We assume that the input prices  w measure the social opportunity
costs of the inputs and that the social cost of managerial effort is  g2a
2.  The salary of the
manager is a transfer payment.
The divergence between the socially optimal decisions and those taken by the manager arises
from the differences in the welfare and managerial objectives.  Given the simple form of the
manager’s utility function and the welfare function, what matters are the relative weights
assigned to net benefits  b, administrative costs  C and managerial effort  a.  These weights
depend on managerial preferences and on property rights.
Without loss of generality, we can set  g2 = b2, so that the welfare function takes full account of
the manager’s private effort cost.
8  Although distributional concerns about the relative merits
                                                                                                                                                      
7 Equality of cross partials of the cost function requires that the technology is smooth enough in the sense of  g
having continuous second derivatives.
8 With more than one health authority we must allow for the fact that there will possibly be different vectors
( b b b b 0 1 2 3
i i i i , , , ) of managerial preference parameters across the health authorities. There is no reason why the8
of patients, providers, taxpayers and administrators are important in health care, they are
picked up in the weights on net benefits and administrative costs.
It seems plausible that  g1 > b1 > 0.  Managers may care about administrative costs for a variety
of reasons which are captured in  b1.  Professional pride in a reputation for “running a tight
ship” tends to increase  b1.  Conversely managers who feel that their prestige and status are
increased if they have more subordinates will tend to have smaller  b1.  Although administrative
costs must be funded from taxation and managers are taxpayers, the effect of a reduction in
administrative costs on the tax bill of any individual taxpayer is negligible.  The welfare
function counts such effects in full since they are summed over all the taxpayers.  We assume
that on balance managers prefer smaller administrative expenditure but that they do not
properly internalise the full social effects of increased administrative expenditure.
It is also plausible that  g0  >  b0 > 0, so that managers are semi-altruistic as regards the social
benefits and costs of the health care outputs produced in their authority.  However, the weight
they place on them relative to their effort costs is smaller than the social weight.
Welfare is maximised in three stages.  At stage 1, expenditure on the administrative inputs  L is
minimised for given levels of managerial effort and  q.  Since the manager's utility is decreasing
in administrative cost, the manager chooses the socially optimal mix of administrative inputs






2 1 0 ) , ; , ( ) ; ( ) , ; , ( w a w x q a C x q b a wL b w x q a S S g g g g g g g + - - = - - = = (12)
Since the welfare function differs from the managerial utility function only in the weights, the
socially optimal stage 2 effort is  a
* =  a
o( q;x,w,g) and the socially optimal stage 3 decision on
quality is  q
** =  q
oo( x,w,g).    The maximised social welfare is
) , , ( ) ( ) , ; , ( ) ; ( ) , ; , ( 0 1
2
2 1 0 g g g g g w x S w a w x q a C x q b w x q a S S
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * = + - - = = (13)
                                                                                                                                                      
social preference parameter on administration costs should differ across authorities. It could be argued that the
parameter on net benefits could vary with the area to reflect say greater value being placed on benefits accruing
in poorer areas. There seem to be no such distributional considerations which would suggest that managerial
preferences as regards the cost of effort should be respected in some areas but not in others. Hence we would
have  g 0
i  possibly varying across areas,  g g 1 1
i i = " , and g b 2 2
i i i = " ,9
where  a a x w a q x w
oo o ** ** = = (, ,) (; , ,) g g .
The cost function  C
o( q;x,w,g)  = C( a
o( q;x,w,g) ,q;x,w,g) shows the administrative costs for a
given quality when the administrative inputs and managerial effort are chosen to maximise
welfare.  Call  C
o( q;x,w,g)  the  first best cost function and suppose for the moment that
C
o( q;x,w,g)  is known.  Given the assumptions about managerial and social preference weights,
it is obvious from the first order condition on effort choice (5) that the manager chooses too
little effort.
9 Consequently the authority will lie above the first best function:
C
o( q;x,w,b)  -  C
o( q;x,w,g) > 0 (14)
However, comparison of the welfare and managerial utility maximising decisions shows that
some care is required in drawing welfare implications from the fact that an authority lies above
the first best cost function.  The welfare loss
) , ); , , ( ), , , ( ( ) , ); , , ( ), , , ( (
) , ; , ( ) , ; , (
w x w x q w x a S w x w x q w x a S
w x q a S w x q a S
oo oo oo oo
oo oo
b b g g - =
-
* * * *
(15)
arises because the manager is incompletely altruistic: she chooses the wrong effort and
endogenous quality.  The excess administrative expenditure (14) fails to reflect the welfare loss
for two reasons.  First, it does not allow for the fact that quality as well as effort diverge from
the social optimum cost.  If  q is in fact endogenous in the sense that it is under the control of
the manager, we have to take account of the first type of error in using (14) as a measure of
(15).  We test for endogeneity of quality in the cost function in section 5.
Second, even if quality is exogenous, so that only managerial effort is at issue, (14) ignores the
cost of the manager's effort.  Since  a
o( q;x,w,g) minimises  C( a,q;x,w)  + g2a
2/g1 the welfare loss
at given quality is proportional to
10
)] , , ; ( ) , , ; ( [
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o o




                                                
9 The effect of the preference parameter on effort is  ¶a
o/¶b1 = - Ca/ ( b1Caa+b2) > 0 and we have assumed that
b1 <  g1.10
The importance of the over-estimation of the welfare loss depends on the relative magnitudes
of the difference between managerial effort costs at the private and social optimum and the
difference between administrative costs at these points.  It is plausible that the difference
between the true welfare loss (the left hand side of (16)) and the measured difference in
administrative costs (the right hand side) is not large.  Managerial effort cost is likely to be
negligible compared with the cost of the other administrative inputs, so that the difference
between the cost of privately and socially optimal managerial effort is also negligible and so the
difference in administrative costs in (14) may be a reasonable measure of the welfare loss from
the manager’s suboptimal effort.
Low managerial effort leads to a welfare loss relative to the first best situation achievable if the
regulator can observe and control managerial effort.  Managerial effort is also likely to be
second best inefficient in the sense that managers can be made better off and administrative
cost reduced even when managerial effort and preferences are not observed.  Since
administrative cost is observable it is possible to design an incentive scheme which makes the
manager better off and reduces administrative costs.
11   The scheme would be equivalent to
increasing the manager’s preference parameter  b1, so that she supplies more effort and reduces
administrative expenditure.
In general managerial incentive schemes will not lead to a first best effort level.  Not only are
the manager’s preferences not fully known, account would also have to be taken of the
unobserved random factors affecting costs and of managerial risk aversion.  Further, if we also
allow for the fact that some aspects of the quality of care may be both endogenous and
observed with error, the optimal second best scheme may be very low power to avoid giving
managers too large an incentive to reduce cost by reducing quality (Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1991) .
                                                                                                                                                      
10  Although the manager’s salary cost  w0 is not a social cost of producing administrative services (the social
cost of managerial effort is  g2a
2) and is included in  C = w0 + wL, it drops out of the difference between
C
o( q;x,w,b)  and  C
o( q;x,w,g), which is just the difference between the costs of vectors of non-managerial inputs.
11  For example, with  w0 = k0 - k1C  ( k1 > 0), the marginal value of additional effort to the manager is  - [ b1  +
( b1 +  b3) k1] Ca - 2 b2a, so that the manager is induced to supply additional effort and  k0 can be set to ensure he
is better off. Since the marginal social value of  w0 is zero suitable choice of the incentive scheme parameters
also increases welfare.11
The administrative cost function which can be estimated is not the first best cost function
C
o( q;x,w,g) but the function corresponding to the effort level of the area with the greatest
effort level:  C
o(q;x,w,b
max ) where  b
max  <  g1 is the maximum value of the preference parameter
b1 across the areas.   Since even the manager with the highest marginal valuation of











max ) will underestimate the
administrative cost reduction which could be achieved by supplying the first best amount of
effort.
However, even in these circumstances there is value in estimating the cost function.  The
differences in costs between areas can be used to identify those where there is apparently poor
performance which merits further more detailed investigation.  The differences in costs which
remain after such investigation provide some guidance as the potential welfare gains from
introducing incentive schemes and other mechanisms for improving performance.
2.3 Implications for estimation results
The second reason for introducing a simple formal model of managerial decisions is to guide
the estimation of the cost function and the interpretation of the results.  We have assumed that
additional effort by managers can reduce expenditure on inputs required to administer the
primary care system.  Assume for the moment that managerial effort is the only endogenous
variable in the cost function.  Effort will be a function of all the other variables in the cost
function and managerial preferences.  To illustrate the implications, suppose that, after suitable
transformation, the true cost function in area  i at time  t is
c x x a it it it it it = + + + d d d e 1 1 2 2 3 ( 17)
where  cit is the (transformed) administrative cost,  x1it is an observable exogenous variable and
x2it is also exogenous but unobserved.   eit is a zero mean i.i.d error term reflecting unobservable
exogenous factors which do not influence managerial effort and are uncorrelated with the  x1it,
x2it.  Assume that the unobserved variable is correlated with the observed:
x x r it i it it 2 0 1 1 = + + f f (18)
and  rit  a zero mean i.i.d. error.  Managerial effort is12
a x x v it i it it it = + + + a a a 0 1 1 2 2 (19)
where  a0 i reflects authority specific factors and  vit is a zero mean i.i.d. error term.
Because the unobserved managerial effort and the unobserved  x2it have area specific
components OLS would yield biased estimates and panel data techniques should be used.
Random effects estimation requires that the area effects are not correlated with  x1 it (Baltagi,
1995).  But the omitted  x2 it are correlated with  x1 it by assumption and the omitted managerial
effort variable is correlated with  x1 it (directly and indirectly via  x2 it) from the manager’s
optimisation problem.  Thus the endogeneity of managerial effort indicates that we should use
fixed effects procedures to estimate the cost function.
The coefficients in the estimated cost equation
c d d D d x it j j
j
it = + +
= ￿ 0 0
2
1 1 (20)
where the  Dj are area dummies, satisfy
plim  d0 =  d0 + ( d2 +  d3a2) f0 (21)
plim  d0 i = ( d2 +  d3a2) f0 i +  d3a0 i (22)
plim  d1 =  d1 + ( d2 +  d3a2) f1 +  d3a1 (23)
It has been suggested (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984; Skinner, 1994) that the estimated area
specific effects  d0 i can be used to make inferences about the relative efficiency of the areas.
We argued in the previous section that a better interpretation of the differences in cost
remaining after allowing for the non-effort variables is as an indication of the possible scope for
welfare improvements from changing incentives.
As the first term in (22) makes clear, the estimated area specific effects can also reflect the
impact of unobserved variables ( x2 it) (Dor, 1994; Newhouse, 1994).  The area effects measure
differences in managerial effort and therefore potential welfare gains only if the unobserved
variables (a) do not vary systematically across areas ( f0 0 i i = " , ) or (b) do not affect the cost
function, either directly ( d2  = 0) or indirectly through managerial effort ( a2 = 0).13
The endogeneity of managerial effort also poses potential problems for the interpretation of the
coefficients on the included exogenous variables, as (23) shows.  Even if the omitted
exogenous variable is uncorrelated with the included one, the coefficient on   x1 it will be biased
because it also picks up the unobserved influence of managerial effort on administrative costs.
From the discussion of the comparative statics of managerial effort in section 2.1 we know that
managerial effort increases with an exogenous variable if and only if increases in effort reduce
marginal cost of the variable.  We have defined all the arguments in  C except  a to have a
positive marginal cost and the cost function we actually estimate in section 5 is multiplicatively
separable ( C = f( x) u( a)) between effort and its other arguments.  This implies, in terms of (23),
that  d1 > 0, but that  d3  < 0 and  a1 > 0, so that the estimated coefficient on  x1 might even have
the wrong sign if the direct effect of   x1 on  costs is more than offset by the cost reduction
caused by the induced increase in effort.  However, we can show that the net effect of an
increase in the non-effort arguments is to increase costs provided only that ln  u( a) convex.
12
This is satisfied by  u( a) = exp( -a) which is implicitly assumed in attempts to estimate
“efficiency” in terms of the residuals or area specific dummies with logarithmic cost functions.
Thus endogeneity of effort will not lead to incorrect signs on the coefficients of exogenous
variables, though it may bias them towards zero.
These conclusions about the interpretation of the coefficients on the observed variables and the
area dummy variables are reinforced when account is taken of omitted variable bias.  This can
arise in the usual way if omitted variables are correlated with included variables.  It can also
arise from endogeneity.  We can test and allow for endogenous included variables but if there
are unobserved endogenous variables they will in general be functions of the exogenous
variables, both observed and unobserved and will impart bias to the coefficients on the
observed variables.
                                                
12  The cost function is  C = f( x) u( a) where  u = e
U and  U’ < 0, U’’ > 0. Differentiate the cost function totally
with respect to one of the non-effort arguments  x of the cost function
dC
dx
C C a C C
C
C x a x x a
ax
aa







Multiplying through by the denominator in the second term, using the first order condition to substitute for 2 b2,
and using the assumed functional form gives
( ) ( ) [ ] sgn / sgn ' ' '' '/ dC dx ff uu u u uu a x = - -
Since   fx  > 0,  u’ < 0,  dC/dx is positive if ln  u is weakly convex, which is equivalent to U being weakly convex.14
We interpret the simple model of administrative costs as warning that care is required in
drawing strong conclusions from empirical estimates of cost functions and of inefficiency.
Such warnings always in order given the imperfections of health service data sets.  A formal
model at least cautions us as the likely sources of bias and possibly their directions.
3. Data and institutional background
During the period of our analysis (1989/90 to 1994/5
13 ) primary care in England was
administrated by 90 Family Health Service Authorities (FHSAs) covering geographically
defined populations of about 500,000.
14   Prior to April 1990 FHSAs were mainly responsible
for administering payments to general practitioners, practice nurses, dentists, opticians, and
pharmacies providing primary care services.  The new GP contract in 1990 expanded the tasks
of FHSAs and increased the range of activities for which GPs could claim payment.  FHSAs
also increased their monitoring role and were expected to improve the quality of primary care
by feeding back information to GPs and encouraging peer review.  From April 1991 practices
were permitted to hold budgets to spend on certain types of secondary care and on
pharmaceuticals.  The budgets were negotiated with FHSAs and administered by them.
The data are annual observations from the Health Service Indicators (HSI), a database
collected by the NHS Executive (NHS Executive, several years).  Table 1 contains definitions
and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.  The dependent variable is the
total revenue expenditure on FHSAs administration in £ 000’ in current prices.
15
The variables we consider to be the main drivers of FHSA administrative expenditure are the
numbers of general practitioners, practice nurses, ophthalmic medical practitioners, dentists
and community pharmacies in the FHSA.
                                                
13  These are financial years running from April 1 to March 31.
14  Before April 1990 FHSAs were called Family Practitioner Committees. In April 1996 FHSAs were
reorganised into 100 new Health Authorities which combined responsibility for secondary and primary care.
15  Expenditure on administration includes: authority member’s remuneration; honoraria, fees etc for FHSA
advisers; medical audit teams fees etc; other salaries and wages; computer supplies and services; other supplies
and services; establishment expenses; bank charges; hire purchase and lease charges; transport and moveable
plant; premises and fixed plant; agency services; recharges from other FHSAs/HAs and NHS Trusts; auditors
remuneration; miscellaneous.15
FHSA accounts do not provide information on prices of administrative inputs.  We therefore
used the New Earnings Survey (Department of Employment, several years) to construct an
index of administrative labour input prices as the regional average gross weekly earnings for
full-time non-manual workers on adult rates in public administration.
16   To allow for other
sources of variation in input prices we also included dummies variables for three types of area,
relative to inner London: outer London, metropolitan areas (roughly other large city areas) and
shire counties (non urban areas).
The obvious major change in the organisation of primary care in the period under consideration
was the introduction of general practitioners fundholding in April 1991.  Fundholding practices
held budgets to cover the costs of referring their patients for certain categories of non
emergency secondary care.  The scheme increased FHSAs' administrative burden as they had
to negotiate the budget for fundholders each year, to monitor financial outcomes and to check
on the use to which fundholders put any budget surplus.  We measure the burden of
fundholding in a year as the proportion of practices which were fundholders in the following
year to allow for the fact that fundholder budgets were negotiated in the previous year.
The quality of the primary health care provided in the FHSAs is proxied by the success of
cervical cytology screening.  Before the 1
st  April 1990 GPs were rewarded for the number of
tests given, while for subsequent years they received target payments if they screened at least a
specified proportion of women aged 25-64 on their list.  Since information on cytology
screening is generated only in connection with payments to GPs we ensure longitudinal
comparability by measuring the quality of screening by the FHSA's  z-score (Armitage and
Berry, 1994).
17
To control for FHSAs characteristics that may affect the costs of administering a given number
of primary care practitioners delivering care a given quality, we used the health of the
                                                
16  In their analysis of hospital cost functions Scott and Parkin (1995) argued that because wages are set by
national bargaining, it is reasonable to assume that labour input prices are the same across units and
consequently, can be dropped from the estimation. However, in order to account for longitudinal variation in
input prices we decided to keep labour input prices in the analysis.
17  The primary care quality index is calculated as  z x x it it t t = - ( ) / s , where  xit represents the number of cervical
cytology tests per eligible population or the proportion of GPs reaching the target of 90% screening for the
eligible population in area  i in year  t, xt is its mean value in year  t and  st is its standard deviation in year  t.16
population as measured by its standardised mortality rate and the population density per
hectare.
4. Model specification and estimation
4.1 Specification of the cost function
We assume that the administrative cost function is multiplicatively separable between the effort
and the other variables:  Cit = ft(xit,xi,qit,wit)e
-ait.  We deflate administrative cost by the input
price index and express the dependent variable as the log of the real value of administrative
costs.  Some of the explanatory variables have zero values for some areas in some years (and
all areas had a zero fundholding proportion before 1991/2).  We therefore adopt the suggestion
of Caves et al. (1980) and use the generalised translog multiproduct cost function, where the
log metric is used for total costs and input prices, and the Box-Cox metric is adopted for the
"outputs" (numbers of GPs, dentists etc) and other area characteristics.  This functional form
has been extensively used in the estimation of cost function in the health care sector.
18   The
cost function is
( ) ( )( )
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The  xjit are the numbers of GPs, practice nurses, ophthalmic medical practitioners, dentists and
community pharmacies administered by the FHSA,  qit is the quality index, and  ymit are
characteristics of the areas, other than their primary care practitioners administered by the
FHSA.  The term  uit reflects the effect of unobservables including managerial effort.  The
transformation parameter  l is to be estimated and nests the linear ( l = 1) and log-linear forms
( l = 0).
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We standardised the data by dividing the explanatory variables by their mean in 1994/95, so we
can interpret the coefficients on the linear terms as cost elasticity evaluated at the 1994/5 mean
values of the explanatory variables.
The degree of economies of scale ( SCE) is the proportionate increase in total cost resulting
from a proportionate increase in all the practitioners.   With the generalised translog cost
function SCE varies with scale and is measured as the inverse of the sum of the cost elasticities
with respect to the practitioners (Caves et al., 1984)
SCE j
j
= ￿ 1/ h (25)
4.2 Estimation
We estimated the generalised translog cost function (23) on data from 1989-90 to 1994-95
using both fixed effect and random effect panel data procedures.  Initial investigations
indicated heteroskedasticity, with the variance of the errors greater for small FHSAs, perhaps
because small FHSAs are more likely to have their administrative costs affected by fixed costs.
For the fixed effect model we therefore apply the White-correction to the standard errors
(Arellano, 1987).
The theoretical model in section 2 suggested that endogenous quality may produce bias in the
estimated coefficients.  It is also possible that the proportion of GP fundholders may not be
exogenous (Baines and Whynes, 1996) since GPs could choose to become fundholders or not
and their decisions may be related to characteristics of their practices and of the FHSA.  We
tested for simultaneity by re-estimating the fixed effect cost function using instrumental
variables.
19   The Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test did not reject the hypothesis that both
quality and the proportion of fundholders are exogenously determined.
20
                                                                                                                                                      
18  See for example Fournier and Mitchell (1992), Dor and Farley (1996), and Wholey et al (1996).
19  The instruments used in the IV estimation were the proportion of GP practising as solo practitioners, the
proportion of GP aged 65 or older, the GP/population ratio, the ratio of practice nurses to GPs, and the squared
values and the interaction between the last two instruments.
20  The Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp. 236-242) exogeneity test yields the value of F(2, 419) = 1.79,
which is well below the significance level ( p. = 0.1678). The F-statistics of the identifying instruments in the
auxiliary regressions showed that the instruments were highly significant, and the overidentifying (OID)18
5. Results
Table 2 reports the estimates of the cost function (23) including the linear, quadratic and cross
product terms.
21   The estimated economies of scale factor (SCE) is evaluated at the 1994/5
means of the explanatory variables and since the variables are standardised at their 1994/5
means the estimated linear terms on the primary care practitioners are the elasticities of
administrative cost with respect to the numbers of GPs, dentists etc.  The fixed effects model is
reported in the first two columns and has positive and significant linear terms for general
practitioners and practice nurses, the linear term for opticians is positive but not statistically
significant and those for dentists and pharmacies are negative, though not significant.  The last
two columns in Table 2 present the estimates of the random effects model.  We argued in
section 2.3 that endogenous managerial effort implied that the random effects specification was
likely to be misspecified.  The Hausman (1978) test indicates that the assumption that area
effects are not correlated with the other regressors cannot be rejected
22  and so the random
effects model is appropriate.
The model of managerial effort in section 2.1 implies that effort will be correlated with the
number of practitioners if the marginal cost of practitioners is reduced by managerial effort
( Caq <0) and if the manager cares about administrative costs ( b1 > 0).  The assumed cost
function is of the form  C=f( x,q) h( a) which implies  Caq < 0.  Since  b1 reflects both managerial
preferences and the incentive structure in primary care administration, the fact that the
Hausman test indicates that area effects are not correlated with practitioners suggests that
incentives to reduce primary care administration costs are negligible.
The random effects model yields economically more sensible results since all the linear cost
terms on the primary care practitioners are positive.  Further, the random effects model
produces much modest prediction errors because, unlike the fixed effects model, it does not
                                                                                                                                                      
restrictions test (Godfrey and Hutton, 1994) suggested that the instruments were valid and the model was not
misspecified ( c
2(5)  = 9.612;   p. = 0.103).
21  The value of  l was chosen to maximise the log-likelihood of the regression and was determined using a grid
search as suggested by Dor and Farley (1996) . The search range was -2.0 and +2.0, with intervals of 0.01.
22  The Hausman procedure tests the assumption that the disturbances do not contain individual invariant effects
which are unobserved and correlated with the independent variables by comparing the coefficients provided by
the fixed and by the random effects models. If the assumption is correct, the coefficients estimated by the two
models are not systematically different and the random effects model is more efficient.19
have to sacrifice a large number of degrees of freedom in estimating area effects.  This is
important when assessing economies of scale or scope.
Both models indicate that the number of general practitioners has the largest proportionate
effect on costs.  This is plausible since the remuneration system for GPs is much more
complicated than for other practitioners.  Density of population is significantly positively
associated with administrative costs in the random effects model.  Since the variable shows
relatively little change over time it may be picking up area effects.  One possibility is that more
densely populated areas have greater turnover of patients on GP lists and so generate more
administration.  The regional dummies are also of the expected sign, indicating that Inner
London areas have significantly higher administrative costs than more rural areas and also than
other urban areas, probably because of differences in property rents.
5.1 Economies of scale
Both models suggest that that there are economies of scale exist in the administration of
primary care.  The fixed effects model estimates that the  SCE is equal to 1.543 but this is not
significantly different from unity.  The random effects model estimate indicates a more modest
SCE, 1.209 which is statistically different from unity because the random effects estimates are
more precise.  The random effects model suggests that there are economies of scale to be
exploited at the mean 1994/5 size of FHSA.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of scale on costs for non local variations in scale.  It is derived
by calculating the administrative cost of an FHSA from the fixed and random effects models
when the primary care practitioner variables are increased or decreased proportionately from
their mean 1994/5 values and the values of all other explanatory variables are held constant at
their 1994/5 means.  The curves plot the resulting total costs divided by the scale factor for the
primary care practitioner variables and can be regarded as the multi-"output" analogue of
single output average cost function.
The curve derived from the fixed effect model is “U” shape and indicates the presence of
economies of scale for small and medium-sized FHSAs.  Economies of scale are exhausted at a
level 20% larger than the average FHSA20
The average cost curve estimated by the random effects model is similar to the fixed effects
model for scales of production near to the mean.  Economies of scale are much less for small
FHSAs.  The random effects model suggests that there are economies of scale at all level of
production.
The fact that both models suggest marked economies of scale for small FHSAs may have some
implications for possible future developments in the administration of primary care in England.
The NHS was reorganised around Primary Care Groups (PCGs) April 1999.  PCGs consist of
around 50 general practitioners with total lists of about 100,000 patients - they are about one
fifth the size of Health Authorities, some of whose functions they have taken over.   Our
estimates suggest that there could be adverse consequences for administrative costs if PCGs
take over all of the primary care administrative tasks previously carried out by FHSAs.
5.2 Economies of scope
There are economies of scope if the cost of administering a given set of primary care
practitioners is less than sum of the costs of administering them separately (Baumol et al,
1982).  One way to measure economies of scope is as the proportionate change in costs from
partitioning the practitioner types into two groups (Fournier and Michell, 1992):
C x C x C x x
C x x
( ,, ) (, , ) ( , , )
( , , )
1 2 1 2
1 2





2 is a partition of the practitioner vector.
Table 3 reports estimated economies of scope for six possible partitions: each practitioner type
separately administered from the rest and practice nurses and GPs administered separately from
all other practitioners.
23   The cost changes are calculated at the 1994/5 means.  Whilst some of
the cost differences are large, only that for separate administration of practice nurses is
significant.
                                                
23  The economies of scope estimated by the fixed effects model are similar but not significant.21
5.3 Fundholding and administration costs
The introduction of fundholding in April 1991 increased the tasks which FHSAs were expected
to carry out.  We included the proportion of fundholding practices to reflect this change in
function.  The regression indicates that fundholding had a significant positive effect on costs,
though its magnitude is small.  Table 4 presents the estimated administrative costs of the
associated with fundholding both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total administrative
costs.  Fundholding accounts for 3.5-4.3% (as depending on whether the fixed and random
effects estimates are used) of the expenditure in administration in the financial year 1994/95
which is between £7.7M - £11M.
5.4 Changes in administration cost over time
Administration cost changes over time for three reasons: changes in the cost drivers (outputs,
quality and control variables); changes in the price of inputs; and shifts in the cost function
across all FHSAs (reflected in the year dummies in Table 2).  The first column in Table 5
shows the proportionate change in the cost each year.  The second column is the change in
costs which would have occurred due solely to the shift in the cost function with the drivers
and input prices held constant.  The third and fourth columns give the proportionate changes in
costs which would be attributable solely to changes in the drivers and in the input prices
respectively.  It is apparent that the changes in the number of practitioners, quality levels etc
have had relatively little effect on total cost over the period.  The effect of input price inflation
is greater but still minor compared with the shifts in the cost function.
The shift of the cost function over time could be the reflection of a number of factors:
(i)  there may have been “negative technical progress”: the technology altered to make it more
costly to administer primary care.  This seems implausible.
(ii) Factor price changes may have not been fully allowed for in our deflation of administrative
costs by input price indices.  Our input price index is imperfect but it is difficult to believe that
there were increases in the prices of inputs used in administering primary care which are
capable of explaining the more than doubling of administrative costs over the period.
(iii) An increase in the administrative tasks performed by FHSAs.  The fundholding variable is
a direct measure of some of the new administrative tasks associated with the internal market22
and is included in the cost drivers.  Since other additional administrative tasks were not
associated with fundholding, the fundholding variable may be an inadequate proxy for all the
increased tasks resulting from the internal market reforms of the early 1990ies.
Total administrative costs of FHSA were £215M in 1994/5 (current prices) and we estimate
that cost increased between 1989/90 and 1994/5 by 123% as a result of shift in the cost
function, rather than to changes in its arguments.  If the year dummies are picking up the effect
of the increase in administrative tasks, we have identified a further large cost of the 1990
reforms.
5.5 Relative efficiency
The estimated cost function can be used to derive an estimate of the difference in costs due to
unobserved area effects, using the estimated fixed effects or, in the case of the random effects
model, from the area residuals.  We calculate the cost effect as the percentage difference
between the cost of the area given its estimated fixed effect and the cost it would have with the
area average fixed effect:  exp{ } F F i - -1where  Fi is the estimated area fixed effect and  F is
the mean fixed effect.  Figure 2 presents a “league table” for the areas with above average
fixed effects and plots the estimated area cost effects and their confidence intervals.
Such area effects have been interpreted as an indicator of efficiency (Schmidt and Sickles,
1984) but we argued in section 2.2 that necessary conditions for this interpretation are that the
number of primary care practitioners and the quality of primary care are exogenous as far as
managers are concerned and the effort of managers has negligible social cost.  Even if these
conditions are satisfied we showed in section 2.3 that the area effects would yield biased
estimates of the differences in managerial effort.
The size of the confidence intervals also indicates that one should be extremely cautious in
using these results to label areas as more or less efficient in terms of their administrative costs.
Figure 2 shows that only a few of the “inefficient” or high cost FHSAs have a cost effect which
is significantly above the mean.  The analysis may however be useful as an initial filter to select
areas for further investigation after allowing for differences in costs associated with routinely
observable factors such as the number of practitioners.23
6. Conclusion
A simple theoretical model of managerial effort to reduce administrative costs reinforces
previous cautions about the interpretation of the results of studies of inefficiency in health care.
Estimated differences in costs measure welfare differences across units only if relevant decision
makers cannot control outputs or quality and if the unobserved effort costs have negligible
social significance.  Further, estimates of cost differences as area fixed effects or as residuals
from random effects models are unlikely to be unbiased if managerial effort is endogenous.
The lesson is that empirical investigation of cost functions needs to rest on careful specification
of the decision generating those cost functions.
Our investigation of the costs of administering primary care in the NHS suggests:
• numbers of general practitioners had the greatest effect on administration costs;
• there were unexploited economies of scale in primary care administration;
• the introduction of fundholding had a significant but relatively small positively impact on
costs;
• most of the doubling of costs over the period 1989/90 - 1994/5 is attributable to shifts in
the cost function, most likely reflecting unmeasured increases in administrative tasks,
including those following the changes to the GP contract in 1990;
• regression based comparison of administrative costs across FHSAs shows that only a
small number can be said to be significantly more costly  ceteris paribus than average.
Policy to reduce administration costs may be best directed at improving the performance
of all areas, perhaps by introduction of incentive schemes, rather than by concentrating
attention on the few obviously high cost areas.24
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Table 1 Description of the variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Administrative costs in '000 £
Financial year 1989/90 741.39 371.01 257.1 1916.83
Financial year 1990/91 1154.64 505.51 502.04 2618.17
Financial year 1991/92 1514.80 609.08 706.03 3181.71
Financial year 1992/93 1798.67 787.46 822.47 5287.41
Financial year 1993/94 2160.38 995.72 731.23 6533.2
Financial year 1994/95 2391.201168.82 902.35 7293.67
Descriptive statistics for the entire sample
Administrative costs in '000 £ 1626.85 968.56 257.1 7293
No. of General medical practitioners (GPs) 287.16 174.02 69 900
No. of Practice nurses 89.77 64.89 0 396
No. of Dentists having contract with the
FHSA
172.87 109.20 38 540
No. of Ophthalmic opticians having contract
with the FHSA
137.93 83.39 15 523
No. of Community pharmacies 108.22 62.51 28 305
%  of Fundholders 11.06 11.30 0 58.04
Population density (population per hectares) 17.80 20.19 0.61 100.76
Quality of cervical cytology tests ( z-values) 10.00 1.00 6.36 12.27
Standardised mortality rate (SMR) 102.10 10.44 76.7 136.527
Table 2 Parameter estimates of the cost function





General practitioners ( x1)  0.603
** 0.286  0.650
*** 0.102
Practice nurses ( x2)  0.063
* 0.033  0.066
* 0.034
Dentists ( x3) -0.035 0.165  0.009 0.069
Opticians ( x4)  0.045 0.048  0.084
*** 0.032
Pharmacies ( x5) -0.027 0.346  0.019 0.082
% of Fundholders  0.036
** 0.017  0.046
*** 0.016
Quality of cervical cytology test  0.188
* 0.098  0.057 0.097
Population density  0.296 0.473  0.055
*** 0.019
SMR  0.043 0.065  0.061 0.073
x1  · x1  1.364
* 0.708 -0.033 0.340
x2 · x2  0.083 0.054  0.065 0.066
x3 · x3  0.972 0.629 -0.296 0.349
x4 · x4 -0.143
* 0.075 -0.312
*** 0.075
x5 · x5 -0.326 0.639 -0.351 0.365
x1 · x2  0.058 0.148 -0.052 0.124
x1 · x3 -0.531 0.413 -0.008 0.284
x1 · x4  0.028 0.161 -0.248
* 0.139
x1 · x5 -1.096 0.710 -0.096 0.289
x2 · x3 -0.179
* 0.095 -0.090 0.086
x2 · x4  0.023 0.051  0.045 0.055
x2 · x5 -0.044 0.089 -0.029 0.085
x3 · x4 -0.316
** 0.143  0.145 0.125
x3 · x5  0.105 0.450  0.322 0.250
x4 · x5  0.409
** 0.178  0.259
** 0.127
Outer London 
a - - -0.106
* 0.054
Metropolitan areas 
a - - -0.172
*** 0.057
Shire counties 
a - - -0.261
*** 0.071
1990/91  0.389
*** 0.018  0.388
*** 0.019
1991/92  0.554
*** 0.021  0.556
*** 0.022
1992/93  0.633
*** 0.024  0.632
** * 0.025
1993/94  0.731
*** 0.026  0.726
*** 0.025
1994/95  0.806
*** 0.027  0.797
*** 0.026
Intercept  7.026 0.238  7.156
*** 0.063
l 1.04  1.04
Estimated SCE 1.543  1.209




RESET [ F(3, 418)] 0.96 0.10
F-test that all  ui =  0 [ F(89, 421)] 4.80
*** -




Test that SCE =1  [ F(1, 421)] 0.27 22.69
***
***  indicates  p  £ 0.01; 
**  indicates 0.01 <  p  £ 0.05; 
* indicates 0.05 <  p  £ 0.1
a: These variables are not included in the fixed effects model as they are time invariant.
b: The Breush and Pagan test that Var ( ui)  = 0.28
Table 3 Estimated economies of scope
Service Mix Estimated economies Probability level
General practitioners vs. Others19.26% p. > 0.6267
Practice nurses vs. Others 26.89% p. > 0.0500
Dentists vs. Others -1.88% p. > 0.9535
Opticians vs. Others -1.94% p. > 0.8895
Pharmacies vs. Others -6.75% p. > 0.8286
General practitioners, Practice nurses vs. Others 21.70% p. > 0.5549
Estimated using the random effects model
Table 4 Estimated administrative cost of fund-holder scheme
Fixed effects model Random effects model
Financial year Cost £ ‘000 % of total
administrative cost
Cost £ ‘000 % of total
administrative cost
1989/90 £0 0% £0 0%
1990/91 £538 0.49% £758 0.61%
1991/92 £1,436 0.98% £2,034 1.22%
1992/93 £3,690 2.17% £5,227 2.67%
1993/94 £5,943 2.95% £8,427 3.59%
1994/95 £7,770 3.55% £11,009 4.30%
Total £19,378 2.11% £27,454 2.60%
Table 5 Estimated changes in the cost function
Financial year % change in cost % change due to changes in





1989/90 - 1990/1 0.61 47.51 -0.36 9.70
1990/1 - 1991/20.33 18.01 2.22 10.24
1991/2 - 1992/30.17 8.20 2.19 6.21
1992/3 - 1993/40.20 10.25 2.15 6.15
1993/4 - 1994/50.09 7.78 0.91 0.39
a: Estimated using the random effects model29








































































Figure 2 Estimated cost effects for higher cost FHSAs
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